102 103 «So, let’s start by saying – Pirni proceeds – that at least two or three fundamental principles emerge, beckoning for clarification. The first one revolves around the idea of ensuring availability. It necessitates that we conceive a future where those who succeed us have access to, at the very least, the same amount of goods that our generation, during our time, has enjoyed and has been able to cultivate. The second principle delves into the concept of converting our actions into a form of waiver to the present, considering how to manage the present while being mindful not to exhaust all resources or to leave nothing for those who will come after us, even when they possess the means. Additionally, there is the need to create another level of goods: it is not sufficient merely to abstain from depleting existing resources; we must actively create a not-yet-existing with the intent of making it accessible to future generations. In summary, we must strive to maintain the levels of existing reservoirs, while also envisioning novel reservoirs and fresh resources that can and should be incorporated into those existing. From this standpoint, the game is exceedingly open-ended. It necessitates renewed dialogues, between new Norths and new Souths of the world, that is, between fresh interpretations of the concepts of the North and South of the earth. These are nothing but chapters within a prospective essay on the theory of international intergenerational justice, each chapter teeming with the vitality of an ongoing discourse in which we endeavor to actively partake. In short, to have our say». At this juncture we have to delve into the climate crisis, an issue that, following the digital revolution, has emerged as the most prominent “fact” of our age, the hyperobject of our era, in the words of another philosopher of the present the likes of Timothy Morton. «This, to me, represents the paramount, the most significant framework of applying the theoretical plexus I was just referring to. How does it intersect with climate? Climate is a fundamental point, because within it there are so many profiles to be considered. The initial and glaring facets, of course, and not as of today, are those that scientists, atmospheric physicists, geologists, astronomers, meteorologists have put before us. A compendium of scientifically undeniable data leaves us with a distinct impression that the situation is leaning in a specific direction. But there are several ethical-social aspects yet to be put to a common factor, underpinned by appropriate measures encompassing both regulatory, i.e. political, realms that can be translated into legal constraints». «Ethics, however, assumes a pivotal role from this perspective, because when we look at the world as a whole, we are faced with one part of it responsible of having produced what we now call climate change, aligned with the very segment that is experiencing its relatively minor consequences. In other words, a portion of the world has cultivated its way of life, its social systems, and, indeed, its legal systems in a notably ambitious manner, pursuing economic models and policies devoted to the consumption of substantial resources. Conversely, another segment of the world has significantly lagged behind in this developmental trajectory and is currently bearing the brunt of the climate crisis». «Consider the plight of small islands that are gradually sinking, compelled to confront ceaseless tsunamis, extreme climatic events, or territories rendered entirely arid, incapable of supporting any kind of agricultural crops or animal husbandry. These territories are home to tens of thousands, hundreds of thousands, or even a few million people. When viewed through a diachronic lens, over the next ten to fifteen years, they will inevitably face the necessity of migration, searching for refuge in other parts of the world where they can live and foster a coexistence comparable to what they once enjoyed – or, naturally, to our own one. Those who endure the most profound repercussions of the climate crisis are those who did not engender it over the centuries and are currently suffering the first and foremost significant consequences in terms of the exploitation of territorial, environmental, and even agricultural resources, in all their myriad forms and species». Pirni's words resonate with clarity, steeped in academic rigor. Yet, they signify potent concepts, constituting an indictment, an acknowledgment of the manner in which we have structured the very conditions that have led me – I realise it as I watch from my laptop screen, standing surrounded by thousands of books and intellectual cuirasses disseminated in my living room – to be here, now, in this way. Me, and not others. Or rather: me as millions and millions of others. Once more, the spectre of Kafka – in whose tales, guilt is never in doubt – returns to loom over me. «From this juncture an option, an ethical option arises, dealing with fundamental elements, namely the need to prepare ourselves for an ecological transition that extends beyond the simple act of holding hands and walking a few extra hours, or using a bicycle instead of a motorbike, or opting for an electric car in lieu of a fossil fuel-powered one. Above all, we need to comprehend how to redistribute resources, giving rise to what is called energy justice: a continuous energy supply, for instance, to countries that presently lack access, conceiving the ecological transition not merely as a jaunt going from certain habits to some better ones; it should also be regarded as a chance of waiver. From this standpoint, intergenerational justice, justice between generations, must be able to make this new spectrum of issues approachable and to acquaint those who must relinquish something with the idea and the need of a renewed form of reciprocity, also and above all between different areas of our earth». To relinquish, that’s right, to moderate. One day, a great Italian banker told me we should draw the line at enough profit. Now Pirni tells me something similar, at the level of soil and resource consumption. However, the crux of the matter hinges on who gets to quantify this elusive "enough". That seems to me the real issue. This pivotal aspect could very well be, at some point, the defining or denying factor in shaping the scope of action – hence, to use an ugly word, of “power”. «The ideas might be here, indeed they are, and it must also be said that our country has often been in the vanguard for their production, for knowing how to launch them, how to be good or innovative in imagining the future from diverse angles. The challenge doesn't merely revolve around cultivating the notion of savings or non-consumption concerning what we currently possess, but it extends to imagining alternatives beyond what we lack. In addressing the concept of Enough, actually, in order to put this at ease – even if it may seem a cheap or partisan joke for the philosophers – I would say that perhaps we should go back to the classics and, alongside reading Plato, we should delve into Book V of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, a seminal text that delineates the Theory of Equity, which makes a further step with respect to the profiles mentioned earlier. How can one be equitable? Aristotle says that equity is the perfecting of justice. But then, how can one be more perfect than justice? If one’s justice is already balancing – you have been wronged, it is returned to you; you have great merit, it is recognized – what could be more perfect than that? Well, in my opinion, and this is how I have tried to portray it, the idea of equity is that of a great theoretical machine for dismantling what I call intergenerational indifference». «But let’s still stick with Enough: let’s imagine that equity is something with respect to which I would have a legal entitlement. That is: let’s imagine that we, together with our children, are all around a table, we have an excellent cake and we start dividing the slices. Probably, being two adults, you and I would be entitled to an extra slice, maybe a bigger one. And yet we decide that even though we are entitled to it, we forego. Despite having that extra chance of development, we renounce. Even though we have that possibility of further gain, we give up. Why? Because, in giving it up, we are making those resources, those goods, those chances of gain and development available for someone else. We are giving up space to give it to someone else, but we are not losing anything, because you and I were already satiated with one slice of cake. We would have been entitled to two, but that would not have given us an additional sense of satiety. There is no profile of further satiety that can give us greater satisfaction, only a sense of over-fullness that is overabundance of the useless, that beyond-Enough that we can no longer afford. Rereading Aristotle then – but perhaps also the medievals, and perhaps the contemporaries too». Yet, the pivotal question that arises in me as I contemplate Pirni's clear reasoning delves more into the primal, darker dimension of human nature. Why should I care about others when I already possess everything I need, and why should I relinquish something for the benefit of individuals who have not yet even come into existence? «I've traversed through an argument against intergenerational indifference. How does this device work? It is rooted in the perception of indifference as generally devoid of positive qualities. While the psychological and moral facets that drive indifference are much more complex, there is also a good indifference, which is the one giving rise to human subjectivity. I am indifferent to those around me, largely because this indifference is a prerequisite for shaping my personal identity, comprehending who am I, and who I aspire to become. This form of indifference, which is an intrinsic part of self-discovery, is not the target of criticism, but rather it is the one manifested as a steadfast neglect of the needs of others, a phenomenon brimming with moral implications. One thing is if you are indifferent towards someone who rings your doorbell tonight asking you for help; but the issue, when indifference is discharged intergenerationally, engenders a massive possibility of moral discounting. Who might harbor a sense of culpability for failing to assist someone they neither know nor will ever? I experience guilt if I decline to aid the individuals who seek help as they enter this threshold at this very moment. Yet, how can I bear a sense of guilt for neglecting to aid the person who will cross this threshold asking for help from someone who will be here in two decades?». «Perhaps we should reassess from this standpoint – and it would be good if, for instance, the banking system also embarked on this journey – the very idea of a banking institution originating from bond law. It is called institution of solidarity. The notion to entertain is that this institution carries forth a bond law wherein I, you or another party decide to buy something, and in doing so, not only we shoulder a portion of the cost, but each of us undertakes the commitment to pay even if someone among us can no longer afford it, thus entering into a solidarity that essentially equates to economic solidity: we are solid enough to be able to absorb the non-payer. Now, on an intergenerational scale, let’s envision how to ensure this solidarity for those who are not yet here. Primarily, by leaving as little debt as we can – because we are aware that they will have to pay it for us. We are, therefore, accountable for their payment, avoiding overspending on our part. This model works for the younger generations, but it is equally applicable to the silver economy, that of the silver generations, those
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